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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 











ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
ERIK K. PARTIN, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37228-2009 




A MOTION TO AUGMENT was filed by counsel for Respondent on June 10, 2010. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, file stamped 
copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Memorandum Opinion Re: Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or in the Altemative New Trial and on Cross Motions of the Parties for Attomey 
Fees and Costs, file-stamped November 25,2009. 
'I C 
DATED this ko day ofJune 2010. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD Docket No. 37228-2009 
• r, .~- r, ~'r "-
'J f i: J ;'" i ~;: ,~; d 
;-. '/ 
--' I ~ ___ ~O<~ ~,_ •• ~~ .. _.r. _~ ..... _"~,._. ~~ . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 








) CASE NO. CV 2008-5227 
) 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION RE 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
) THE VERDICT OR IN THE 
) ALTERNATIVE NEW TRIAL AND 
) ON CROSS MOTIONS OF THE 
) PARTIES FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
) AND COSTS 
) 
) 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendant for Judgment NOV or 
New Trial and on the cross motions of the parties for an award of attorney fees and 
costs. Plaintiff ("Schroeder") is represented by Brooke Baldwin, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant ("Partin") is represented by Lane Jacobsen, Attorney at Law. Argument of 
these matters was presented on November 23, 2009 and the matter is deemed under 
advisement as of that date. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Schroeder sued Partin for allegedly breaching a contract involving the assembly 
and installation of a hemi engine into a Barracuda car. Partin sued Schroeder for 
payment of his services relating to this work. The case was tried to a jury which 
answered special interrogatories and determined that both parties breached their 
agreements. The jury awarded Schroeder $7,578.11 as a consequence of Partin's 
failure to properly assemble and install the engine in the car. The jury also awarded 
Schroeder $10,000 for breaching a performance agreement executed between the 
parties. In doing so it specifically found that there was consideration for the performance 
agreement, that Partin breached the agreement and that the damage clause in the 
performance agreement met the criteria set forth in the jury instructions. The jury also 
found that Schroeder owed Partin $9,221 for the reasonable value of parts and services 
provided by Partin to Schroeder. 
Accordingly, the Court entered a net judgment on October 6, 2009 in favor of 
Schroeder in the amount of $10,685.11.1 On October 16, 2009, Partin timely filed a 
Motion for Judgment NOV or in the Alternative for a New Trial. Schroeder has filed an 
objection to this motion. 
On October 19, 2009 Schroeder filed a Motion and Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees seeking costs as a matter of right of $1096.88, discretionary costs of 
$152.29, and attorney fees of $21,664.75 for the four attorneys from Wright Brothers 
Law Office, PLLC who worked on the case. Schroeder claims that he is the prevailing 
party in this case. Partin has not filed a formal objection to this motion but asserts in his 
1 This amount reflects the parties' stipulation that Schroeder had previously paid Partin $2,328.00 for his 
services. The net result of this stipulation reduced the "award" to Partin to $6893. 
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motion for fees that he also prevailed in this action. The Court considers this as a valid 
objection to an award of fees and costs, albeit not an objection to the amount of those 
fees and costs. 
On October 20, 2009 Partin filed a Motion and Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees seeking costs as a matter of right of $1,213.94 and attorney fees of 
$22,289 for Mr. Jacobson.2 He claims that both parties should be considered a 
prevailing party. Schroeder filed a timely objection to this motion asserting that he is the 
prevailing party in this action. However, he did not object to the amount of those fees 
and costs. 
A. Motion for Judgment NOV or for New Trial. 
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("NOV") the moving party 
admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may be legitimately 
drawn therefrom. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 274, 561 P.2d 1299, 
1307 (1977). Such a motion should not be granted if there is substantial evidence to 
support the verdict. Id. All that is required is that the evidence be of such sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude the verdict of the 
jury was proper. Id. In considering this motion the trial court is not free to make its own 
findings of fact but must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 420, 835 P.2d 651, 655 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
2 The Court notes that another attorney also represented Partin during the course of this litigation. However, no fee 
claim has been submitted for the services of that lawyer. 
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The standard to be applied when ruling on a motion for new trial pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) is much different. In ruling upon a motion for a new trial premised 
upon inadequate or excessive damages, the rule the trial court must follow is set forth in 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,603 P.2d 575 (1979): 
Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or excessive 
damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the 
jury's award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the 
disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not 
stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor 
is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is 
sufficient. A trial court is not restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or 
excessive 'as a matter of law.' Blaine v. Byers, supra. Additionally, the rule 
that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial but 
conflicting evidence has no application to trial court ruling upon a motion 
for a new trial. Blaine, supra; Rosenburg v. Toetley, 93 Idaho 135, 456 
P.2d 779 (1969)." Id. at 625-26, 603 P.2d at 580-81. 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). 
There is a qualitative difference between a trial judge's role in deciding whether a 
new trial is justified based on the insufficiency of the evidence under Rule 59(a)(6), and 
whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's award of damages 
under Rule 59(a)(5). On a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), unlike a 
motion for a directed verdict or judgment NOV the trial court has broad discretion to 
weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and it may set aside the verdict 
based upon its independent evaluation of the evidence, even though there is substantial 
evidence to support the verdict. Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 631, 769 P.2d 
505, 508 (1989). In considering a motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), the trial court is required to undertake a two-part 
analysis. First, the court is to consider whether the verdict was against the weight of the 
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evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict The court 
then must consider whether a different result would follow in a retrial. Burggraf v. 
Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 174, 823 P.2d 775, 778 (1991). The trial court is not merely 
authorized to engage in this weighing process, it is obligated to do so. Sanchez v. 
Galey, 112 Idaho 609,614,733 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1986), Litchfield, 122 Idaho at 422. 
1. Damage award for repairing the engine. 
Partin asserts that the jury miscalculated the amount of damages awarded to 
Schroeder for repair of the engine and that the verdict should be reduced by $1,548. 
He makes this argument based upon his analysis of the repair bill of Mark Kidd. 
Schroeder presents a different interpretation of Mr. Kidd's bill and further asserts that 
there were items of property not returned to Schroeder, but which he had paid for. 
Applying the standards set forth above the Court denies Partin's motions for 
judgment NOV concerning the damage award for repairing the engine. There is 
substantial evidence to support the juris findings of damages as noted in Schroeder's 
briefing. Likewise there is no basis for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) because this 
award does not "shock the conscience" of the Court. Nor was there insufficient 
evidence in the record to support the jury's finding on this issue and thus no basis for a 
new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). 
2. The Performance Agreement. 
When Schroeder and Partin reached an agreement for Partin to build and install 
the hemi engine they did not agree on a time when this task was to be completed. By 
September 2008 Schroeder became dissatisfied with Partin's lack of performance arid 
visited Partin at his shop. Shortly thereafter Partin, unsolicited, prepared a written 
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statement advising Schroeder that if he, Partin, did not complete the project by October 
8, 2008 that he would pay Schroeder a "penalty" of $2500 and $100 per day until the 
project was completed. This statement was presented to Schroeder at Partin's request. 
Schroeder countersigned the statement. 
Partin did not receive possession of the vehicle until 75 days after the deadline 
set forth in the performance agreement. Mathematically then, Partin owed Schroeder 
$10,000. The foregoing evidence was uncontradicted at trial. The jury was instructed 
concerning liquidated damages pursuant to IDJI 9.04 and on the law of consideration. 
The jury determined that Partin owed Schroeder $10,000. 
Partin continues to argue that there was no consideration for the performance 
agreement, and that even if there was this award constitutes an inappropriate penalty 
and the jury's verdict must be set aside. The jury made a specific factual finding that 
this agreement was supported by consideration. Throughout this case Schroeder has 
argued that ailowing Partin to keep the vehicle after his visit in September 2008 until 
October 8, 2008 constituted a form of forbearance of his right of possession of the 
engine and car. This argument was made to the jury. Partin asserts that Schroeder 
had no right of possession because his bill had not been paid and he had a right to 
possession of the engine and car in order to preserve his lien rights. This argument 
was also made to the jury. Schroeder counters this argument by pointing out that 
Schroeder did not even know of the billing until December when he received possession 
of the vehicle following court action. This argument was also made to the jury. 
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As noted the jury was instructed regarding the law of consideration. Jury 
Instruction No. 35. Partin's offer to complete the vehicle by a stated time (October 8) 
modified the terms of the parties oral agreement and set a definite time for performance. 
Schroeder accepted this unilateral contract modification when he was not required to do 
so. In doing so he gave up something of value-the right to obtain possession of his 
vehicle. It is immaterial whether he could in fact have obtained possession because of 
the asserted lien rights. The forbearance has some value and thus is valid 
consideration. The Court finds that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's 
finding in this regard and for that reason Partin's motion for judgment NOV on this issue 
must denied. 
Partin further contends that the jury erred in concluding that the contract was a 
valid liquidated damages provision. To prevail on this issue the Court must be satisfied 
that the trial record establishes that: 1) the damages to not bear any reasonable 
relationship to the damages actually sustained and are exorbitant; and/or 2) the 
damages are not intended to be compensation for the consequences of a breach of the 
contract, but rather a penalty. Jury Instruction 40A. Partin bears the burden of proof on 
these issues. Id. 
If there is substantial evidence to support a finding that $2,500 for two weeks of 
continued possession of the vehicle by Partin and $100 per day thereafter until the 
vehicle is completed bears a reasonable relation to damages actually sustained by 
Schroeder, then the motion for judgment NOV must be denied. After carefully analyzing 
the evidence presented in this case, the Court concludes that there is not substantial 
evidence to support the jury's award of damages for breach of the performance 
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agreement and Partin's motion for judgment NOV must be granted. The Court 
concludes that not only could reasonable persons not make this finding, but that it is a 
penalty and exorbitant under the facts of this case. 
The parties here are not in disagreement concerning the test as to the validity of 
liquidated damages. In McEnroe v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 600 (Ct. App. 
1984) our Court stated: 
Generally speaking, parties to a contract may agree upon liquidated 
damages in anticipation of a breach, in any case where the circumstances 
are such that accurate determination of the damages would be difficult or 
impossible, and provided that the liquidated damages fixed by the contract 
bear a reasonable relation to actual damages. But, where the forfeiture or 
damage fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation 
to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and unconscionable, it is 
regarded as a "penalty", and the contractual provision therefor is void and 
unenforceable.Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451,456,272 P.2d 1020, 1023 
(1954). See also Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977); 
Schlegel v. Hansen, 98 Idaho 614, 570 P.2d 292 (1977). The question 
before us, then, is whether the forfeiture of the Midland property as 
liquidated damages was reasonable in relation to the actual damages 
suffered by the McEnroes and was not "exorbitant and unconscionable. 
106 Idaho at 326. 
The evidence produced at trial does not support the jury's verdict. Schroeder 
asserts that the performance agreement provides for valid damages to compensate 
Schroeder for: (1) value of possession of the vehicle; (2) compensation for decrease in 
the market for such vehicles; and (3) as an offset for any moneys owed to Partin. In 
addressing this issue the Court must focus on whether the liquidated damages fixed by 
the contract bear a reasonable relation to actual damages. The only testimony in this 
case concerning "actual damages" suffered by Schroeder was his generic testimony 
that the market value of barracuda cars with hemi engines was decreasing from the 
time that he started the project until his receipt of possession of the vehicle in December 
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2008. There was no direct testimony of this "market decline" between September 2008 
and December 2008-the time relevant to the liquidated damage issue. His testimony 
that a "fair value" of damage was $100 per day based upon the daily "fair rental" value 
of a vehicle also does not support his position. He did not drive this vehicle and only 
intended to "flip" it. Schroeder argues that Partin achieved a benefit from continuing to 
possess the vehicle. The test for damages when evaluating a liquidated damages 
clause is the damage occasioned by the non breaching party, in this case Schroeder, 
not Partin. Offsetting Partin's bill against the contract damage amount is likewise not 
the proper test when evaluating the "actual damages" sustained by Partin. There is no 
evidence upon which a jury could conclude how the sum of $2,500 represents a 
reasonable measure of damages for continued possession of the car for two weeks as 
compared to $100 per day thereafter. Simply stated, this jury did not have evidence 
that would permit them to make the evaluation required by the jury instruction. 
Schroeder argues that Partin failed to offer any evidence to establish that the 
liquidated damages provision was not reasonably related to the damages actually 
suffered by Schroeder or that such provision is exorbitant or unreasonable. The Court 
again disagrees with Schroeder's analysis. True, Partin did not bring in witnesses to 
affirmatively demonstrate there was no actual loss to Schroeder. Nor was he required 
+" rio s" Da ..... i .... hearS fhe h •• rrlen of nrf"\of not the hurrlon Of nrod"cinf'l e\lirlonf"'o lV U V. I I UI I U I \.II IJUI \.A I I 1,...,1 V I, I .. 1.1 ItJ I U"" I 1,...,1 l.A II'~ v .............. IV"""', 
Schroeder's own admissions (other than his vague assertions of damage) established 
there was no actual damage reasonably related to the performance contract. 
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The fundamental flaw with Schroeder's approach in this case is that the parties 
never negotiated a liquidated damages clause. At most the evidence merely shows that 
Partin came up with the $2,500 figure because that was his "standard deaL" Does 
Partin's acknowiedgement that $2,500 is a reasonabie sum for continued possession of 
the vehicle for two weeks satisfy the lack of proof of actual damages? The Court 
concludes that it does not under the circumstances of this case. The parties' mere 
statement in an agreement of the damages is not sufficient to satisfy the test concerning 
the reasonableness of liquidated damages. If it was then there is never a reason to 
evaluate these clauses. Partin's acknowledgement of the amount of damages is not the 
proper test for evaluating reasonableness. 
The Court is mindful of the standards that must be followed by this Court in ruling 
on a motion for judgment NOV. This Court is also mindful of the deference it must give 
to a jury verdict. However, under the circumstances of this case the Court is left with 
the firm belief that the performance contract provides for no more than a penalty and 
that based upon the evidence presented at trial it has no reasonable relation to the 
damages actually sustained by Schroeder occasioned by Partin's failure to timely 
complete the project. Indeed Partin's own words state that these sums are a "penalty." 
Moreover, under any reasonable view of the evidence a $10,000 award for a three 
month delay in completing a project that had already consumed nearly two years is 
exorbitant given that the total compensation to be received by Partin was just slightly 
more than this figure. 
For these reasons Partin's Motion for Judgment NOV on this issue shall be 
granted. In light of this ruling the Court need not address Partin's Motions for new trial. 
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B. Motions for Costs and Attorney Fees. 
"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as 
defined in [1.R.e.p.] 54(d) (1) (8), when provided for by any statute or contract." It is 
undisputed by both parties that attorney fees are awardable pursuant to I. C. § 12-120. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine 
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and 
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1) 
(8). Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(8), there are three principal factors the 
trial court must consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: 
(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) 
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) 
the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or 
issues. Chadderdon, 104 Idaho at 411, 659 P.2d at 165. The "result 
obtained" may be the product of a court judgment or of a settlement 
reached by the parties. Jerry J. Joseph C.L.v. Assoc., supra; Ladd v. 
Coats, 105 Idaho 250,668 P.2d 126 (Ct.App.1983). 
Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259,999 P.2d 914 (Ct 
App.2000). 
Where there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that a 
party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award 
of fees to the prevailing party on that claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates 
an award of fees only to the party or parties who prevail "in the action." Chenery v. Agri-
Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687,692,682 P.2d 640,645 (Ct.App.1984). 
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Discretionary costs "may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of 
justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(D). 
In this case both parties ciaim that they are the "prevaiiing party." The Court 
concludes that both parties prevailed in this case within the meaning of I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(B). The gravamen of this action by Schroeder was that the hemi engine was 
not properly built and that he was damaged to the extent of monies incurred to repair 
the engine. The jury sided with him on this issue. The gravamen of Partin's counterclaim 
was that he had not been paid for his services. The jury also sided with him on this 
issue, albeit it did not award all of the damages that Partin sought. 
But Schroeder contends that the jury's award of damages for breach of the 
performance contract "tilts the scale" and makes him the prevailing party because he 
recovered on all of his issues, not just some. The Court disagrees with this assertion. 
First, the Court has granted Partin's motion for judgment NOV. Thus, there is no great 
disparity in the amounts of damages awarded to either party. Second, while Schroeder 
prevailed on his damage claim because he recovered more damages than Partin 
(approximately $700) does not necessarily make him the prevailing party. The issues of 
the complaint and the counterclaim were intricately intertwined. Schroeder's percentage 
of recovery based upon his proof at trial was greater than Partin's percentage of 
recovery. However, even this disparity is insufficient to convince the Court that 
Schroeder prevailed "in the action." In its discretion the Court concludes that both 
parties prevailed in this case. 
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There is a more fundamental reason why both sides are entitled to the costs of 
right and attorney fees claimed in this case. Neither has objected to the amount of 
claimed fees and costs. Failure to object to timely object to a cost claim constitutes a 
waiver thereof. i.R.C.P. 54(d)(6). This rule places an affirmative burden on the 
objecting party to challenge the amount of costs claimed. Schroeder's objection does 
not challenge the amount of fees claimed. Of course he argues that Partin is not the 
prevailing party. Partin's motion asserts that both parties prevailed and hence suggests 
that neither side should be awarded fees or costs but likewise does not challenge the 
amount of fees claimed. The Court concludes that both parties have waived objections 
to the amount of each other's cost bill. However as stated above, both parties are 
entitled to an award of fees and costs as a prevailing party. 
Even in the absence of an objection it is the obligation of the Court to review an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e) (3). The Court has examined the 
affidavits of all counsel and considered all of the factors set forth in this rule. Having 
done so, in the absence of some specific objection to the cost bills, the Court concludes 
that the costs of right and attorney fees claimed shall be awarded to each party as 
requested. The discretionary costs claimed by Schroeder will not be allowed because 
there is no showing that these costs were "necessary and exceptional" as required by 
I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1). 
Schroeder is awarded costs of right in the sum of $1,096.88 and attorney fees of 
$21,664.75 for a total cost award of $22,761.63. Partin is awarded costs of right in the 
sum of $1 ,213.94 and attorney fees of $22,289.00 for a total cost award of $23,502.94. 
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CONCLUSION 
Partin's Motion for Judgment NOV is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART 
as set forth above. Partin's Motion for New Trial is DENIED. 80th parties' motions for 
attorney fees and costs are GRANTED, except for the disallowance of Schroeder's 
request for discretionary costs. Schroeder shall be awarded $7,578.11 damages and 
$22,761.63 for attorney fees and costs for a total award of $30,339.74. Partin shall be 
awarded $9,221.00 damages (less $2,328) and $23,502.94 for attorney fees and costs 
for a total award of $30,395.94. Therefore an Amended Judgment shall enter in favor of 
Partin in the amount of $56.20. Plaintiff's writ of execution is quashed and any order 
staying execution of judgment shall be vacated. 
Dated this ~Y of November 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /).2 day of November 2009, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Brooke Baldwin, Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 226 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303 
V. Lane Jacobson, Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5827 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-5827 
~.S.Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( ) Court Folder 
a()' U.S. Mail 
. () Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( ) Court Folder 
~~ Clerk 
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